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The Exclusionary Rule in Parole
Revocation Hearings: Deterring Official
Infringement of Parolees' Fourth Amendment
Rights
Courts have generally held that parolees are entitled to the
protection of the fourth amendment1 against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' Attempts to define. the actual protection
afforded by the reasonableness requirement, however, have led to
considerable ~ontroversy.~
The courts do seem to agree on one
matter-evidence seized through an illegal search by either a
police officer or parole officer is inadmissible in a new criminal
prose~ution.~
On the other hand, the issue of whether courts will
exclude from revocation proceedings evidence illegally seized by
police officers, has received no definitive resol~tion.~
More impor1. The Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), said:
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." The Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with
the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the
. and was intended to protect the "sanctity of a man's home and
Colonies,
the privacies of life,"
. from searches under unchecked general authority.
Id. at 482 (citations omitted). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,624-30 (1886).
2. E.g., United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787,789 n.2 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Latta
v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1975)); Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 682
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 84, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1973).
3. A major point of division among courts is the issue of whether the fourth amendment requires that a parole officer obtain a search warrant before conducting a search of
a parolee or his residence. Many courts have held that it does not. E.g.,Latta v. Fitzharris,
521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); People v. Robarge, 151 Cal. App. 2d 660, 312 P.2d 70
(1957); People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (1956); People v. Randazzo,
15 N.Y .2d 526,202 N .E.2d 549,254 N .Y. S .2d 99 (l964), cert. denied, 381 U .S. 953 (1965).
Other courts have found that it does. E.g., United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th
Cir. 1978); State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970). See Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp.
678, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("the differences in judicial expression have to do not with the
requirement of reasonableness, but how that concept is defined").
4. E.g., United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970)
(police officer); United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966) (police officer and
parole officer); United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y.
1975) (parole officer); United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (FBI
agents); State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970) (police officer and parole officer);
State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75,516 P.2d 1
T(1973) (police officer and parole oficer).
See State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495, 498-99 (Me. 1975) (police officer).
5. Compare United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1915); United States v.
Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d

..

..

162

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

tantly, the courts have largely ignored or avoided the question
whether evidence illegally seized by parole officers should be excluded from revocation pro~eedings.~
The reluctance of the Fourth Circuit to address this last
named issue in Bradley u. United States7is typical. In this case,
the court held that absent a recognized exception such as exigent
circumstances, the fourth amendment requires a parole officer to
obtain a search warrant based on probable cause before conducting a search of a parolee or his residence? Consequently, the court
held evidence seized by a parole officer in a warrantless search
inadmissible in new criminal proceedings, and Bradley's conviction based on such evidence was reversed? The court indicated
in a footnote, however, that while it reversed Bradley's conviction
"because his fourth amendment rights were violated by the warrantless search, [it expressed] no view of the effect, if any, of [its
decision] on the revocation of Bradley's parole. "lo
This Comment will discuss and attempt to resolve two related issues: (1)whether the exclusionary rule should be applied
in a parole revocation proceeding where a police officer conducts
an unreasonable search of a parolee, and (2) whether the rule
should be applied where a parole officer conducts an unreasonable search.ll Before addressing these issues, however, a brief
discussion of the exclusionary rule in general should prove helpful.
1161 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D.
La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495
(Me. 1975); and State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190, 499 P.2d 49 (1972) with Michaud v.
State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) and Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976).
6. See United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 n.6 (4th Cir. 1978); State v.Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa 1970); Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and
Parole Revocation: A Policy Appraisal, 54 TEX.L. REV.1115,111711.13 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal]. But see Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d
199,200 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495,499-500 n.6 (Me. 1975)
(citing United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1166 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Lumbard, C.J., Concurring)) (exclusionary rule could become applicable in revocation
proceedings).
7. 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).
8. Id. a t 789.
9. Id. a t 790.
10. Id. a t 790 n.6.
11. This Comment will not deal with the issue of what-coiiaitutes m-unreasomMe
search of a parolee under the fourth amendment. Rather, it will deal with what the result
should be once a search by either a policeman or a parole officer is found unconstitutional.
That is, given an unreasonable search of a parolee or his residence, should illegally seized
evidence be excluded from parole revocation proceedings?
Although this discussion is limited to parolees, most of the considerations and observations regarding parole revocation proceedings apply to probationers as well. Therefore,
cases involving probationers are also relied upon. The Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scar-
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The exclusionary rule is the primary vehicle employed by
courts to implement the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures by enforcement officials. l2 Application of the exclusionary rule has been justified on the basis of two
different theories: (1) it deters official conduct violative of the
fourth amendment, l3 and (2) it maintains "the imperative of judicial integrity."14 The latter theory rests on the proposition that by
admitting illegally obtained evidence, the courts become accomplices to the willful violation of the Constitution. Since
judges are sworn to uphold the Constitution, their admissions of
illegally obtained evidence undermine respect for the law. l5
Recent Supreme Court decisions have limited the theory of
judicial integrity as a justification for the exclusionary rule?
These decisions establish that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule, "if not the sole one," is to deter future illegal conduct.17In United States u. Calandra,18the Court stated:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the
injury to the privacy of the search victim:
"[Tlhe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late."
Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful
pelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), noted that: "Despite the undoubted minor differences between
probation and parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation . . . is
constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole." Id. at 782 n.3. See State
v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 79, 516 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961); id. at 670 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 665-66 (1970) (exclusionary rule is "sole" technique available to courts).
13. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-48 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
14. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
15. Id. at 222-23 (relying on Justice Holmes' opinion in Olmstead v. United States,
227 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Contra, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
491 (1976); Cole, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation Proceedings:
Some Observations on Deterrence and the "Zmperative of Judicial Integrity, " 52 Cm.KENTL. REV. 21, 50 (1975); Oaks, supra note 12, a t 669.
16. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,485 (1976) ("While courts, of course, must ever
be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited
force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence."); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433,446 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,347 (1974); Cole,
supra note 15, at 38.
17. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976). See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 486 (1976).
18. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).

164

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11979

police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way- by removing the incentive to disregard it. " W

In a related vein, the Court found that "the rule is ajudicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."" Therefore, the
rule "has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. . . .
[T]he application of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served."21In determining when to apply the exclusionary rule, the
Court has balanced the rule's potential harm-excluding relevant
evidence-against its potential benefit-deterring illegal behavior .22
The balancing engaged in by the Supreme Court, however,
has focused on the probable deterrent effectB rather than the
potential injury to society. It is only where the Court has described the possible deterrent effect as insubstantial, marginal, or
speculative that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence has not
been required."
The Supreme Court recently applied these principles in the
case of United States v. Janis. In Janis, the Court considered the
application of the exclusionary rule in federal civil proceedings to
evidence illegally seized by state law enforcement agents. The
Court first reasoned that the object of any exclusionary rule sanction is deterrence of illegal police conduct. The Court then
pointed out that the "concern and duty" of state police officers
is criminal law enforcement." Civil proceedings fall "outside the
19. Id. a t 347 (citations omitted).
20. Id. a t 348 (footnote omitted). Contra, id. a t 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. Id. a t 348.
22. E.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273-79 (1978); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-60 (1976); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350-52 (1974); Alderman v. United Stags, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75
(1969).
24. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54, 458 (1976); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974).
25. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
26. Id. a t 448. Consequently, the state officers were already punished by the exclusion
of the evidence from state and federal criminal trials. Id.
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offending officer's zone of primary i n t e r e ~ t . "Hence,
~~
imposition
of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings would not result in
any significant deterrent effect." Under this analysis, the Court
found extension of the rule to civil proceedings unju~tified.~~

Most of the arguments relating to extension of the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings are applicable to both police
and parole officer searches. Differences arise only when considering the possible deterrent effects. The arguments applicable to
both parole officer and police officer searches will be discussed in
conjunction; the deterrent arguments will then be considered
separately.

A. General Arguments
The major arguments against extending the exclusionary
rule to parole revocation proceedings place heavy emphasis on the
special role of the parole system. The two primary purposes of
parole are to protect society and to promote the rehabilitation of
the criminal.30Disallowing the introduction of illegally seized evidence in parole revocation proceedings may endanger society by
permitting dangerous criminals to remain free? It is also feared
27. Id. at 458.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 459-60.
INQUIRY
ON PAROLE
AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE,
INC.,PRISONWmowr
30. E.g., CITIZENS
WALU4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PRISONWITHOUT
WALLS];
R. DAWSON,
SENTENCING
ON PROBATION,
PAROLE
AND PARDONS
332 (3d ed.
317-26 (1969); C. NEWMAN,
SOURCEBOOK
1968).
31. The California Supreme Court has stated:
[TJhe social consequences of imposing the exclusionary rule upon the [Adult
Authority] can be disastrous. Conceivably, if the improperly obtained evidence
were the sole basis for parole revocation, the authority might find itself unable
to act in the case of the paroled murderer whom the police improperly discovered had cached a minor armory for future use or the paroled narcotics peddler
who had collected a quantity of heroin for future sale. Although we recognize,
of course, that such evidence would not be admissible in a court of law, we
believe that an agency whose delicate duty is to decide when a convicted offender can be safely allowed to return to and remain in society is in a different
posture than the court which decides his original guilt. To blind the authority
to relevant facts in this special context is to incur a risk of danger to the public
which, at least as of this date, outweighs the competing considerations of a
problematical gain in deterrence.
In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 650, 463 P.2d 734, 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 851 (1970). A risk to society is created by releasing prisoners on parole. This risk
would be greatly increased if society could not return unrehabilitated criminals to prison.
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that application of the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings "would tend to obstruct the parole system in accomplishing
its remedial purposes."32
Exclusion would place an additional burden of surveillance
on parole officers in a system that is already understaffed and
~ n d e r f u n d e dChief
. ~ ~ Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit, concurring in United States ex rel. Sperling u. Fitzpatrick,? observed:
To apply the exclusionary rule in the context of parole revocation hearings a t the present time would merely exacerbate the
problems [created by overworked and underfunded parole offices]; to import fourth amendment suppression law into this
process would in fact be counterproductive. Parole officers
would be forced to spend more of their time personally gathering
admissible proof concerning those parolees who cannot or will
not accept rehabilitation. Time devoted to such field work necessarily detracts from time available to encourage those parolees
with a sincere desire to avoid the all-too-familiar cycle of recidivism. An even greater potential loss'would be in the time available to counsel and supervise-particularly
in the early
months-those who leave confinement with the question of rehabilitation in real doubt.
. . . [A] double application of the exclusionary rule is not
warranted a t the present time. I draw this conclusion by balancing the interests of all parolees in securing administration of the
parole system which is as nearly consonant with its dual goals
as is possible at present levels of staffing and funding against
the interest of individual parolees . . . in not being subjected to
[unconsitutional] search[es] . . . .35

Some suggest that the rehabilitative goals of the parole system require the admission of all evidence relevant to the parolee's
rehabilitation. A more accurate evaluation of the parolee's progress can be made if all evidence relating to his conduct is considSee Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972); The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy
Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1120.
32. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (2d Cir.
1970). See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975).
33. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel.
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161,1164-65(2d Cir. 1970) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
Contm, The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1127. See generally
R. DAWSON,
supra note 30, at 326; PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSIONON
LAW ENFORCEMENT
-AND
ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE,
TASKFORCE
REPORT:CORRECMONS
70 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK
FORCE
REPORT:CORRECTIONS].
34. 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
35. Id. at 1165-66(Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
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ered." Admission of evidence of parole violation, although illegally seized, allows the system to remove from society those parolees who manifest a present inability to successfully rehabilitate.
This lightens caseloads and reduces supervision duties of parole
officers.37
Another important consideration is the effect extension of
the exclusionary rule would have on the parole revocation hearing
itself. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the rights of a
parolee in a revocation hearing are not coextensive with those of
In fact, there are critical
an accused in a criminal prose~ution.~~
differences between criminal trials and revocation hearings:
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor;
formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost if not timely raised;
and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a presentation understandable to untrained jurors. In short, a criminal trial under
our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State
is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer . . . ;
formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and
the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems
and practice of . . . parole.3D

Similarly, the Court in Morrissey v. Brewefl0 stated that
"there is no thought to equate . . .parole revocation to a criminal
prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process
should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters,
affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an
adversary criminal triaY41 This opinion also pointed out that
states have an "overwhelming interest in being able to return [a
parole violator] to imprisonment without the burden of a new
adversary criminal
The problem with extending the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings is that it could transform the informal hearing
envisioned by the Supreme Court into a full adversary process.
36. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1975) (probation);The
Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1117.
37. The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1127. See United
States ex ref. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1165 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lumbard, C.J.,
concurring).
38. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
39. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973).
40. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
41. Id. at 489.
42. Id. at 483.

168

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

Application of the exclusionary rule would require parole boards
to make technical legal rulings regarding the su.ppression of evidence." In turn, parole board members would have to receive
legal trainingd4and parolees would require legal counsel to ensure
that appropriate and timely motions are raised in their behalf.45
Making parole revocation hearings more complex would make
them more time consuming. Moreover, the state would fi,nd it
more difficult to return incorrigible parolees to p r i s ~ n . ~ T h i s
would not only substantially threaten public safety, but would
also endanger the vitality of the parole system for those who are
actually helped by it. If parole boards knew it would require the
equivalent of a new conviction to return parolees to prison it is
possible they would grant parole less frequently."
Two significant facts affect the arguments against extending
the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings. First, excluding
relevant evidence from a parole revocation proceeding is no more
dangerous to the public in general than is exclusion of evidence
from a criminal trial. Admittedly, there is a greater possibility
that a parolee will commit a crime than an ordinary citizen." The
43. Revocation proceedings are currently informal in nature and lack "technical rules
of procedure or evidence." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U S . 778, 786-87 (1973). Application
of the exclusionary rule would require a suppression hearing which is a technical procedure. Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
44. This would require certain states to revise their systems. New York, for example,
currently imposes no specific qualifications for membership on a parole board. PRISON
WITHOUT
WALLS,supra note 30, a t 9.
45. The Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), observed:
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. If counsel is provided for the . . . parolee,
the State in turn will normally provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training and
disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions and to contest
with vigor all adverse evidence and views. The role of the hearing body itself,
aptly described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discretionary" as well as
factfinding, may become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned
to the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee. In the
greater self-consciousnessof its quasi-judicial role, the hearing body may be less
tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate
than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the State-for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, and the possibility of judicial review-will not be insubstantial.
Id. at 787-88 (footnote omitted).
--46. Id. a t 789-90.
47. See State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190, 194-95, 499 P.2d 49, 52 (1972) (extending
exclusionary rule to probation hearings could discourage use of probation).
48. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972); .TASKFORCEREPORT:
CORRECTIONS,
supra note 33, at 62.
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real question, however, is whether there is a greater possibility
that a person who remains on parole by virtue of the exclusionary
rule will be more of a threat to public safety than an accused who,
by successfully seeking exclusion, avoids conviction for a serious
crime. Both have shown a penchant toward illegal activity, and
there are no indications that an accused left free will be any less
likely to renew criminal activity than a parolee who remains on
parole. Indeed, since a parolee who has been discovered in a parole violation knows that he will thereafter be placed under
stricter supervision by his parole officer, it is more likely the
parolee will observe the law than will a criminal suspect who
must be released without supervision of any kind.49
Second, although society has an interest in the successful
rehabilitation of offenders,50which interest would be damaged if
any use of the exclusionary rule resulted in fewer successful rehabilitations, parolees stand to lose the most from extending the
exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings. They will be losers
as a class in two ways. Extension will result in parole officers
having less time to devote to parolees as advisors. The rule's
application will also discourage use of the parole system as an
alternative to continued incarceration. Thus, the brunt of the
argument against extending the exclusionary rule to revocation
proceedings is that it would do parolees more harm than good.
The tendency of the exclusionary rule to complicate and disrupt
the parole system would be more detrimental to parolees than the
unreasonable searches the exclusionary rule would prevent?
In rebuttal to the above arguments it has been suggested that
excluding illegally seized evidence would actually enhance,
rather than impair, the rehabilitative goals of the parole system.
Admitting unlawfully seized evidence, it is argued, would aggravate the parolee's bitterness toward the system, while recognizing
the fourth amendment rights of parolees by excluding such evidence would help engender the respect for the law that is essential
to successful rehabilitati~n.~~
The strongest arguments favoring application of the exclusionary rule focus on the right of parolees to be free from unrea--

-

-

49. See The ~xclusionaryRule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1128.
50. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190,
195, 499 P.2d 49, 52 (1972).
51. See United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1166 (2d Cir.
1970) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
52. The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1126.
-

-
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sonable searches and seizures.53Since parole revocation results in
incarceration, the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in revocation hearings arguably provides an incentive to disregard
parolees' important fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches.54To destroy this incentive for unlawful conduct,
illegally seized evidence should be excluded?

B. Arguments Relating to Deterrent Effect
Parolees will gain as a class from the application of the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings only if it actually deters
official misconduct. Because of the differences which exist between the roles of police officers and parole officers, the deterrence arguments will be treated separately.
I.

Police officer searches

A potent argument against application of the exclusionary
rule in revocation proceedings to evidence illegally seized by po53. See State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533,537-38 (Iowa 1970);Michaud v. State, 505
P.2d 1399, 1402-03 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
54. In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 652-53, 463 P.2d 734, 742, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390,
(Peters, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970); Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399,
1402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (only
effective way to deter illegal searches is to remove incentive to disregard it by disallowing
use of the fruits of illegal activity); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 613 (9th Cir.
1968) ("the use of illegally seized evidence a t sentencing would provide a substantial
incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures").
55. This argument rests on the premise that exclusion of evidence actually deters
unlawful conduct. Due to the lack of adequate empirical data, it is uncertain whether this
premise is justified. The Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954),
stated:
What actual experience teaches we really do not know. Our cases evidence the
fact that the federal rule of exclusion and our reversal of conviction for its
violation are not sanctions which put an end to illegal search and seizure by
federal officers. . . . There is no reliable evidence known to us that inhabitants
of those states which exclude the evidence suffer less from lawless searches and
seizures than those of states that admit it.
Id. a t 135-36. The Court's doubts on this issue were reiterated in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960), and more recently in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976),
where the Court stated:
[Allthough scholars have attempted to determine whether the exclusionary
rule in fact does have any deterrent effect, each empirical study on the subject,
in its own way, appears to be flawed. It would not be appropriate to fault those
who have attempted empirical studies for their lack of convincingdata. The
number of variables is substantial, and many cannot be measured or subjected
to effective controls. Recordkeeping before Mapp was spotty a t best, a fact
which thus severly hampers before-and-after studies.
Id. at 449-52 (footnotes omitted).

PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS

lice officers is that it would not result in any significant deterr e n ~ e Even
. ~ ~ though exclusion of illegally seized evidence from
criminal prosecutions may deter unlawful police conduct, exclusion from parole revocation hearings would probably not deter
police invasion of fourth amendment rights. Only police searches
consciously directed a t parolees would be deterred by this extension of the rule," and then only in cases where the officers consider revocation an adequate substitute for a new criminal prose~ u t i o n Indeed,
. ~ ~ it is highly unlikely that a police officer would
ever consider parole revocation as an alternative to a criminal
conviction unless he were aware of the suspect's parolee
Consequently, a double application of the exclusionary rule is
uncalled for. "The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is
adequately served by the exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal prosecuti~n."~~
The above argument loses its force when a police officer who
conducts an unreasonable search has prior knowledge of a suspect's parolee status." Independent prosecution and revocation
under an old conviction are often interchangeable to the informed
officer.62If a police officer is aware that illegally seized evidence
may be used to revoke a suspect's parole, he will have a considerable temptation to conduct an unlawful search.63This temptation
56. E.g., United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); Cole, supra note
15, a t 33-37.
57. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted)
(probation).
58. If the crime committed is serious, a police officer may want to be able to use
available evidence to obtain a new criminal conviction, rather than a parole revocation.
Under such circumstances, a police officer would have a strong incentive to adhere to
fourth amendment reasonableness requirements even if he were aware of the suspect's
parolee status. See Cole, supra note 15, a t 36-37.
59. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); Cole, supra note
15, a t 33-37.
60. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970).
61. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally R.
supra note 30, at 145, 319, 342.
DAWSON,
Parole officers often look to police officers to furnish information on the activities of
parolees. As a result, the parole agency often notifies the local police of a parolee's presence, status, and background. TASK
FORCEREPORT:CORRECTIONS,
supra note 33, ,at 69.
62. In United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971), a probation case, Judge
Fairchild stated: ''[Yhe fact that an independent prosecution and revocation under an
old conviction are often interchangeable . . . suggests that abrogation of the exclusionary
rule for . . . revocation would seriously undermine the rule's effect as a deterrent." Id. at
820 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). See Momssey v. Brewer, 408 U S . 471, 479 (1972) (parole
revocation "often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of recomsupra
mitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State"); R. DAWSON,
note 30, at 363.
63. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
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is removed if illegally seized evidence is excluded from revocation
proceedings as well as new criminal prosecutions. Therefore, the
deterrent purposes of the rule will be furthered if illegally seized
evidence is excluded from revocation proceedings where police
officers are aware of a suspect's parolee status a t the time of' an
unlawful search.64
2. Parole officer searches

The parole officer plays a unique role within the parole system. As the official primarily responsible for supervision of the
parolee in the community, the parole officer has two functions:
(1)to aid parolees in their rehabilitative process and (2) to protect
society." In this supervisory capacity, the parole officer is simultaneously a counselor to the parolee and an enforcement officer."
In his enforcement role the parole officer has the duty to
initiate the parole revocation process when necessary. The decision to recommend that a parolee have his parole revoked is
highly discretionary, but it is not made unless it is believed that
the parolee has seriously violated the conditions of his parole or
has returned to criminal activity." Upon making such a recommendation, the parole officer must justify his decision to the parole board. t~
Parole revocation is not an infrequent occurrence. Between
thirty-five and forty-five percent of adult offenders released on
parole are eventually returned to prison? The majority of these
Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 1971) (Fairchild, J., dissenting); The ~xclusionaryRule:
A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, a t 1125-29.
64. See United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1975).
65. R. DAWSON,
supra note 30, at 317-18. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,479
(1972).
66. PRISONWITHOUT
WALLS,supra note 30, a t 75. The attitudes of parole officers
toward these roles vary. Some parole officers are "law enforcement" oriented while others
concentrate on the "social work" aspect of their position. R. DAWSON,
supra note 30, a t
318. Many parole officers express dissatisfaction with the present arrangement because
WITHOUT
WALLS,
supra note 30, at 75they believe these dual functions conflict. PRISON
78. As a result, some suggest that the present law enforcement role of parole officers should
WITHOUT
WALLS,supra note 30, at 181; R. ERICKSON,
W. CROW,L.
be abolished. PRISON
ZURCHER,
& A. CON=, PAROLED
BUTNOT FREE 101 (1973); see TASK
FORCEREPORT:
CORRECTIONS,
supra note 33, at 69.
67. See, e.g., Momssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,478-79, &-86 (1972); PRISOb3 W m OUT WALLS,supra note 30, a t 129-33; R. DAWSON,
supra note 30, at 339-40, 358, 367-77.
See generally C. NEWMAN,
supra note 30, at 73-80.
68. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 484-90 (1972).
REPORT:CORRECTIONS,
supra note 33, at 62.
69. TASKFORCE
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are returned through the revocation process.70Since parole officers initiate this process and must substantiate their reasons for
doing so, the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in revocation proceedings provides a substantial incentive to parole officers to infringe on the fourth amendment rights of parolee^.^'
Perhaps the only practicable way to deter unreasonable parole
officer searches, then, is to exclude the fruits of such searches.j2
Indeed, if the exclusionary rule is ever effective in deterring unlawful official conduct, this would seem to be a prime example
of where its objectives could be realized.73
The deterrence argument strongly favors extension of the
exclusionary rule to revocaton hearings where a parole officer has
unreasonably searched a parolee, and under certain circumstances, where a police officer engages in an unlawful search.
This argument must be weighed against the arguments favoring
rejection of the rule.

C. Balancing the Competing Interests
The determination of whether the exclusionary rule should
be extended to parole revocation proceedings eventually results
in a balancing test. Normally, the potential harm to society is
balanced against the potential deterrence of unlawful police conduct. In the past, the Supreme Court has held that the cost to
society outweighs the potential deterrent effect of the rule only
where it has first characterized any potential deterrence as mini. ~ ~ this test extension of
mal, insubstantial, or s p e ~ u l a t i v eUnder
the rule to parole revocation proceedings would be appropriate
since the deterrent effect could not always be classified as negligible. The exclusionary rule's potential adverse effect on the parole
system and hence on parolees, however, supplies a unique twist
that cannot be overlooked.
-

-

-

--

-

--

70. Id.
71. The problem is aggravated since parole authorities often would rather see evidence used in a parole revocation proceeding than a criminal prosecution. Parole agencies
are sensitive to media criticism that arises when a parolee is prosecuted for a new crime.
supra note 30, at 364.
Revocation may be a way of avoiding adverse publicity. R. DAWSON,
72. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961). But see United States ex rel.
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970).
73. Although the actual effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is uncertain, it seems
reasonable that if parole officers wanted evidence of parole violation or criminal activity
for revocation purposes, but knew that any evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment could not be used, they would be careful to conduct their searches in compliance with the reasonableness standards of the fourth amendment.
74. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
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Besides the cost to society,75two competing interests of parolees may be taken into account in the balancing process. On one,
side of the scales could be placed the parolees' interest in being
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. On the opposite
side could be placed the detrimental impact parolees would suffer
should extension of the rule result in less liberality on the part of
parole boards in granting parole and less individualized attention
from parole officers. Under such a test the potential harm may
outweigh the potential benefit to parolees,76despite the possible
deterrent effect that could be derived from application of the rule.
There is a substantial problem with this rationale: it requires
the balancing of two unknowns-the supposed harm to the parole
system and the potential deterrence of unlawful enforcement conduct. Experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible
to measure the deterrent effect that results from the exclusionary
rule.77Likewise, it is impossible to measure before the fact the
damage to the parole system that would result from extension of
the exclusionary rule to revocation pr~ceedings.~Whould
experi75. Exclusion results in societal harm since "the public [has an] interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the
evidence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75
( 1969).
76. Some courts have argued for this conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Winsett,
518 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d
1161,1163-64(2d Cir. 1970);United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648,
650-51 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curian, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Simms,
10 Wash. App. 75, 79-80, 516 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1973).
77. See note 55 supra.
78. It is not entirely certain whether a displacement of parole officer time by an
increased burden of surveillance would result in less effective rehabilitation. One survey
has suggested that there is no correlation between successful rehabilitation and the
WALLS,supra note 30,
amount of time parole officers devote to parolees. PRISONWITHOUT
at 170-71.
It is also highly unlikely that application of the exclusionary rule would discourage
parole boards from granting parole for a t least two reasons. First, parole board decisions
are often arbitrarily made. E.g., PRISONW ~ O UWALLS,
T
supra note 30, a t 176-72 TASK
FORCEREPORT:
CORRECTIONS,
supra note 33, at 63. In fact, concern that a parolee is likely
to return to criminal activity often does not discourage parole boards from paroling certain
WITHOUT
WALLS,
supra note 30, a t 63-64; R. DAWSON,
supra note
convicts. E.g., PRISON
30, a t 278. It seems doubtful that a parole board that does not hesitate to grant parole,
even when the danger of recidivism is high, will be hindered by the prospects of more
stringent procedural requirements in revocation proceedings. Second, and perhaps of
greater consequence, economic pressures and the lack of prison facilities require that a
large number of inmates be paroled each year. See Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal
Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV.702,705-07 (1963). Extension of the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings will not change this. On the other hand, application
of the rule might spur desperately needed reform in the present system. See generally
PRISON
WITHOUT
WALLS,
supra note 30, a t 178-82; R. DAWSON,
supra note 30, at 415-24; C.
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ence prove this damage to be intolerable, however, application of
the rule could be discontinued.
It is proposed that courts use the test developed by the Supreme Court that focuses primarily on the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule.7BThis test requires reliance on common sense
and human nature rather than precise legal analysis,"' since there
has been no adequate empirical data to measure the effectiveness
of the rule.s1The test is, however, manageable and workable. It
merely requires evaluation of the circumstances in given situations to determine if applicaton of the rule would result in only
minimal or speculative deterrence. If it is decided that the deterrent effect would be insubstantial, the rule is rejecteden2
According to this test, evidence illegally seized by parole
officers should be excluded from revocation proceedings, since the
deterrent effect cannot be classified as insubstantial or speculative as the Court has used these terms." In the context of police
officer searches, the rule developed for probationer cases in
United States v. Winsetts4should be applied. In that case the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Therefore, in light of the minimal deterrent effect, if any,
that would result from extension of the exclusionary rule and the
danger such extension would pose to the probation system, we
conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of evidence in a probation revocation proceeding where, a t
the time of arrest and search, the police had neither knowledge
nor reason to believe that the suspect was a pr~bationer.~"

Evidence should be excluded, however, when police officers are
aware of a suspect's parolee status before conducting an unreasonable search, since there is a high probability that the prospect
of having illegally seized evidence excluded from both criminal
NEWMAN,
supra-note 30, at 332-41; TASKFORCE
REPORT:
CORRECTIONS,
supra note 33, a t 116.
79. This test should be followed as long as the exclusionary rule is used as a means
of protecting fourth amendment rights. There is a possibility, of course, that in the future
the rule will be abolished or greatly restricted in its application. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 496, 500-01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). But see Franks v. Delaware, 98
S.Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978). See generally Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAC.L.J. 33 (1979).
80. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961).
81. See note 55 supra.
82. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 67-73 and accompanying text supra.
84. 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975).
85. Id. a t 55.
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and revocation proceedings would deter them from such unlawful
a~tivity.~~

Two important considerations emerge from the arguments
concerning extension of the exclusionary rule to parole revocaton
hearings. First, application of the rule would not only result in the
normal cost to society of excluding relevant evidence, but it might
also cause substantial harm to the parole system and hence to
parolees. Consequently, parolees could be simultaneously benefited and injured through its application. Second, in determining
whether to extend the exclusionary rule it has been the practice
of the Supreme Court to apply a test that focuses on deterrent
effect. As a result, application of the rule has been denied only
where the potential deterrence has been characterized as minimal
or insubstantial.
Rather than attempt to balance the competing interest of
parolees, courts should follow the past practice of the Supreme
Court in determining whether to extend the exclusionary rule to
parole revocation proceedings. According to this test, evidence
illegally seized should be excluded from parole revocaton hearings
when: (1) a parole officer conducts an unlawful search or (2) a
police officer, having prior knowledge of a suspect's status as a
parolee, conducts an unlawful search.

Billy Glenn DuPree, Jr.
86. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.

